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Abstract: Starting from the 5.0 Lollipop release all Android processes must be run inside confined SEAndroid access
control domains. As a result, Android device manufacturers were compelled to develop SEAndroid expertise
in order to create policies for their device-specific components. In this paper we analyse SEAndroid policies
from a number of 5.0 Lollipop devices on the market, and identify patterns of common problems we found.
We also suggest some practical tools that can improve policy design and analysis. We implemented the first
of such tools, SEAL.
1 INTRODUCTION
During the past decade Android has gained a consid-
erable share of the mobile device market. However,
at the same time the number of malware and vari-
ous exploits available for Android has also been in-
creasing (Zhou and Jiang, 2012; Smalley and Craig,
2013). Many classical Android exploits, such as Gin-
gerBreak and Exploid (Smalley and Craig, 2013), at-
tempt to target system daemons that run with ele-
vated, often unlimited, privileges. Once such a dae-
mon is compromised, the whole Android OS usually
becomes compromised and the attacker is able to get
permanent root privileges on the device. Since the
Android permission system, which relies on Linux
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), cannot protect
from such attacks, a new Mandatory Access Con-
trol (MAC) mechanism has been introduced. SE-
Android (Smalley and Craig, 2013) is an Android
port of the well-established SELinux MAC mech-
anism (Smalley et al., 2001) with some Android-
specific additions and modifications. In SELinux,
security decisions are taken according to a policy:
the reference policy for SEAndroid was created from
scratch and is maintained as part of the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP) 1.
Starting from the Android 5.0 Lollipop release,
the Android compliance requirements have mandated
that every process must be run inside a confined SE-
1source.android.com
Android domain with a proper set of access control
rules defined. This has put many Android Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the difficult po-
sition of enabling SEAndroid in enforcing mode on
their devices with a set of fully configured access con-
trol domains. While the reference SEAndroid pol-
icy is provided by AOSP, any OEM customization to
the reference AOSP device design results in a need
for SEAndroid policy modifications. Writing well-
designed SELinux policies requires expertise; this
difficulty, together with high time-to-market pressure,
can possibly lead to the introduction of mistakes and
outright vulnerabilities in modified SEAndroid poli-
cies deployed in OEM Android devices.
In this paper, we conduct a systematic manual
analysis of several available SEAndroid 5.0 Lollipop
OEM policies and identify common patterns and mis-
takes. We find that OEM modifications can render
policies less strict, resulting in a wider attack surface
for potential vulnerabilities. Based on these findings,
we identify a number of practical tools that can assist
SEAndroid policy designers and researchers to ana-
lyze and improve SEAndroid policies. We also pro-
vide an initial implementation of one such tool, SEAL.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first com-
parative study of SEAndroid policies from real-world
devices.
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2.1 SELinux
SELinux (Smalley et al., 2001) is a well-established
MAC mechanism available for Linux-based distribu-
tions. It was the first MAC for mainstream Linux
with its initial release in 1998. SELinux has been
implemented in the Linux kernel following the Flask
architecture (Spencer et al., 1999), where the policy
enforcement code, known as Linux Security Module
(LSM) Framework, and the policy decision-making
code are separated: this allows other MAC modules,
such as AppArmor (Bauer, 2006) or Smack (Schau-
fler, 2008), to utilize the same policy enforcement
code. Conceptually, the LSM framework is a set of
hooks in security-sensitive places of the Linux ker-
nel, allowing a certain operation, like opening a file,
to succeed only if the hook function returns a positive
answer. Compared to other MAC modules in the up-
stream Linux kernel, SELinux can be considered to
be the most fine-grained. It is also widely considered
to be the most difficult to understand and manage, be-
cause it does not have any learning mode as AppAr-
mor or a simple minimal policy like Smack (Ahmad,
Ali, 2014). Despite this, a number of distributions
such as Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) and Fe-
dora have SELinux enabled and in enforcing mode by
default, with pre-defined security policies.
SELinux actually supports a number of indepen-
dent MAC mechanisms on its own, such as Do-
main/Type Enforcement (Badger et al., 1995), Role-
Based Access Control (Sandhu et al., 1996) and Mul-
tilevel Security (MLS) (Qiu et al., 1985). In principle,
if one were to write an SELinux policy from scratch,
it is possible to use only one or a combination of these
mechanisms. However the reference SELinux policy
utilizes all three of them, making it harder for a novice
to become proficient in understanding and managing
it. The SELinux Domain/Type Enforcement mecha-
nism assigns a type to each subject or object in the
system; a subject’s type is also known as domain. A
subject running in domain can only access an object
belonging to type if there is an allow rule in the pol-
icy of the following form:
allow domain type : class permissions
where class represents the nature of an object
such as file, socket or property, and permissions
represent the types of operation on this object that
are being controlled, like open, write, set etc. Sub-
jects can change their domain if a corresponding type
transition rule is defined. For example, if a process
executes a new binary, it is possible for the resulting
process to run in a different domain. Such a transition
rule will be represented as:
type transition olddomain type:process
newdomain
where type denotes the type of a binary that
should be executed in order for the transition to hap-
pen. We will use the term process transition in the
future to refer to such a rule. In practice there are a
number of additional rules that are needed in order
to make the transition happen, but we leave them out
here for the sake of simplicity. Another type of tran-
sition can occur if an object is created and its type
should differ from the type of the object’s parent. For
file creation inside an existing directory such a rule
can be represented as:
type transition domain oldtype:dir newtype
where domain denotes the domain of the subject
creating the file, oldtype represent the type of the
directory where the file is being created and newtype
denotes the type that the new file should be assigned.
In addition, the SELinux policy language has the
following notions:
• An attribute is a way to refer to sets of types
and domains. It is used to express type hierarchies
and rule inheritance. For example, SELinux poli-
cies on Android define an app attribute consist-
ing of common rules for all platform applications
such as the ability access the device display.
• Initial Security Identifier (SID) are types
that should be assigned by default to subjects and
objects during system initialization, such as for
example kernel and init.
• genfs contexts define types that should be as-
signed to objects residing in special filesystems,
such as proc, debugfs and ecryptfs.
2.2 SEAndroid
The SELinux port to Android, SEAndroid (Smalley
and Craig, 2013), was mostly based on SELinux code
with some additional LSM hooks to support Android-
specific mechanisms, such as Binder Inter Process
Communication (IPC). However, the SEAndroid ref-
erence policy was written from scratch due to 1) a de-
sire for a simpler and a smaller policy and 2) the big
difference between the userspace layers of Android
and a standard Linux distribution.
Currently, the SEAndroid policy only uses Do-
main/Type Enforcement from SELinux. SEAndroid
classes and permissions are mostly the same as on
SELinux, with some Android-specific additions like
the property class for the Android init-based prop-
erty service and the keystore key class for the An-
droid keystore key object.
Native services and daemons are assigned SEAn-
droid domains based on filesystem labeling or di-
rect domain declaration in the service definition in
the init.rc file. In turn, applications are assigned
domains based on the signature of the Android ap-
plication package file (.apk). There are a number
of predefined application domains, like system app,
platform app and untrusted app. OEMs are able
to create additional domains if needed.
One new notion that SEAndroid has is the pres-
ence of neverallow rules in the source policy.
A neverallow rule specifies that certain accesses
should never be allowed by the policy. For example,
the following neverallow rule asserts that only pro-
cesses running in the init domain should be able to
modify security-sensitive files in the proc filesystem:
neverallow {domain -init}
proc security:file {append write}
If one tries to add a rule that conflicts with a
neverallow rule, the policy compilation fails. Since
the Android 5.1 Lollipop release, OEMs are not al-
lowed to modify the AOSP set of neverallow rules,
which makes it a very strong enforcement point in
guiding OEM policy modifications.
SEAndroid was initially added to the AOSP code-
base for Android 4.3 back in 2012; at that point, it
was configured in permissive mode. In Android 4.4,
SEAndroid was switched to enforcing mode: how-
ever, most domains were left in permissive mode,
apart from a number of core AOSP domains such as
init and vold. Android 5.0 Lollipop eventually re-
quired every single process to be put in an enforcing
domain, effectively extending the enforcement to the
whole system.
2.3 OEM Modifications to the AOSP
SEAndroid Reference Policy
Default AOSP services, processes and applications
are already covered by the AOSP SEAndroid refer-
ence policy. Typically, OEM Android devices are
highly customized with their own specific drivers,
new services, processes and filesystem mounts. In or-
der for these custom components to work, appropriate
additions must be made to the SEAndroid reference
policy. OEMs were allowed to make additions to the
SEAndroid reference policy right from the start, but
very few of them actually did in Android 4.3 and 4.4:
and in fact, the resulting policy was stricter than the
AOSP reference policy. The stringent requirements
of Android 5.0 Lollipop, however, forced all OEMs
to deploy comprehensive policies defining complete
rules for their own custom services: this turned out
to be a challenging task for most. The inherent diffi-
culty of incorporating SEAndroid in the development
process, combined with high time-to-market pressure,
has resulted in the introduction of anti-patterns, mis-
takes and potential vulnerabilities in OEM policies.
3 SEANDROID POLICIES IN
DEPLOYED OEM DEVICES
3.1 Statistical Analysis
We collected 8 policy files from non-rooted, off-the-
shelf commercial Android 5.0 Lollipop devices by
different manufacturers. Table 1 shows the compar-
ison of all basic policy attributes and characteristics
with regards to the Android 5.0 Lollipop AOSP SE-
Android reference policy and the Fedora 22 minimal
desktop policy in the following categories:
• Policy size. All OEMs increased the policy size,
by factors ranging from 1.1 up to 3.2. The refer-
ence Fedora policy is still bigger than the biggest
OEM policy by a factor of 10, which is due to a
number of reasons. First, Fedora’s SELinux pol-
icy uses Role-Based Access Control with 14 roles,
8 users and 414 role transitions, as well as MLS
categories with 5466 MLS range transitions. Sec-
ond, policy in Fedora actively uses SELinux pol-
icy booleans (293 policy booleans are defined) in
order to be able to dynamically adjust policy be-
havior, as well as portcons statements that allow
to assign security contexts to UDP or TCP ports.
In addition, Android has fewer components and
processes running in userspace compared to a typ-
ical desktop system such as Fedora.
• Types, domains, type transitions and domain
transitions. The overall ratio of newly added do-
mains to newly added types ranges between 4.7
and 6.5, which is very close to the ratio in AOSP
itself (6.3). We conjecture that OEMs tend to
add slightly simpler domains, with fewer types
per each domain defined. The ratio of newly
added process transitions to newly added domains
is close to 1; this indicates that OEMs add sim-
ple domains, with only one process transition to
these domains either from the init domain (upon
system startup) or from the parent process do-
main (usually upon execution of processes such
as shell or toolbox). This ratio is 1.4 for LG
G3, due to a number of newly defined domains
and having two or more transitions to the shell,
toolbox, dumpstate and logcat domains. New
type transitions are mostly used by OEMs for
tmpfs types, as in the following example:
type transition aal tmpfs : file
aal tmpfs
• Allow rules. The ratio of total number of allow
rules to total number of types varies between 10.9
and 13.1, with the exception of 14.8 for Motorola
G and 18.7 for LG G3; the ratio for AOSP is 12.0.
The numbers for Motorola and LG are compara-
tively excessive, and may indicate overly permis-
sive policies; this may be due to the use of tools to
automatically generate policies from system logs.
• Attributes. Only Samsung and Sony define new
attributes. Sony adds only one, probably related
to the system update process. In contrast, Sam-
sung adds many new attributes, which seem to be
auto-generated and most probably used for policy
optimization. The rest of the OEMs add separate
domains for their services and applications, and
do not introduce any new domain hierarchies: this
may imply unfamiliarity with the use of policy hi-
erarchies.
• Classes, permissions and initial SIDs. OEMs do
not modify the default set of SEAndroid classes
(86), permissions (267) or initial SIDs (27): this
is to be expected, since they represent interfaces
and objects recognized and supported by SEAn-
droid. The only change we observed was for Sam-
sung S6, that had 4 more permissions defined:
delete as user, get by uid, insert as user
and set max retry count, all granted on the
keystore key class. The most probable reason
for such additions is Samsung’s implementation
of the keystore and its API, which requires spe-
cific permissions. Compared to Fedora, SEAn-
droid has three more classes due to the Binder IPC
support.
• genfs contexts. The primary reason for the ad-
dition of genfs contexts is that most OEMs have
additional mount points and filesystems on their
devices, which by default would be labeled as
unlabeled unless a proper genfs context for it
is specified. An AOSP neverallow rule prohibits
any OEM domain from creating files with this
type: this restriction has forced OEMs to define
proper types for their new mount points.
3.2 Systematic Manual Analysis
We manually searched each policy for OEM miscon-
figurations: we used existing tools for SELinux policy
analysis, which we found to be cumbersome. Our pri-
mary tool was apol (Tresys, 2014), a GUI tool that
allows the user to load a binary policy and examine
it by specifying various filters. However, apol was
not suitable for comparing two policies: it was nec-
essary to run two instances of apol simultaneously,
manually insert the same queries into both and exam-
ine the differences between the outputs. Another tool
was sediff (Tresys, 2014), which can do basic pol-
icy comparison but does not allow filtering based on
specific types or domains.
To make our manual analysis tractable, we iden-
tified three sets of types that we consider impor-
tant to check. The first set comprises core Android
and security-sensitive domains, such as init, vold,
keystore, tee, as well as types that protect access
to security-sensitive areas of the filesystem, such as
proc security, kmem device and security file.
The second is the set of default types that would be as-
signed to an object upon its creation unless a concrete
type is specified in one of the policy files. The third
is the set of types that would be assigned to untrusted
code and its data, primarily the untrusted app do-
main.
Analyzing these sets of types and the associated
rules, we discovered the following patterns across
many devices from different OEMs.
3.2.1 Overuse of Default Types
As mentioned above, a default type is one that is
assigned to an object upon creation unless a dedi-
cated type for it is specified in the policy files: exam-
ples include unlabeled, device, socket device,
default prop and system data file. Table 2
shows that in many cases OEMs overuse the default
SEAndroid object types. For example, compared
to AOSP, HTC M7 has 10 new rules allowing vari-
ous system daemons, such as healthd, netd, vold,
mediaserver, wpa, system server, to set system
properties with the default type default prop. In
practice, this means that some of the system prop-
erties belonging to these components end up la-
beled as default prop. Similarly, HTC M7 has
13 more rules granting various system daemons
(rild, mediaserver, thermal-engine, sensors,
thermald, system-server, . . . ) write access to
the default socket device object type. The only ex-
ceptions when OEM actually reduced the number of
rules with regards to default types are LG Nexus 5 and
Motorola G policies, where a rule for logd to access
/setypedevice was removed, and Samsung S6 policy
where a set of rules for unused unconfined domain
was removed. Below are concrete example rules from
different OEMs to show the usage of default types:
Table 1: Policy comparison and complexity.
size (KB) types domains type trans process trans allow rules attributes genfs contexts untrusted app rules
Fedora 3851 4638 802 16917 11795 102645 357 101 n/a
AOSP 117 341 54 95 41 4096 21 30 33
LG Nexus 5 134 416, +75 65, +11 158, +63 51, +10 4972, +876 21 32, +2 33
Intel 127 393, +52 65, +11 115, +20 51, +10 4748, +652 21 32, +2 38, +5
HTC M7 181 621, +280 106, +52 213, +118 95, +54 7587, +3491 21 34, +4 46, +13
Motorola G 193 590, +249 92, +38 199, +104 83, +42 8753, +4657 21 33, +3 33
LG G3 302 851, +510 149, +95 340, +245 180, +139 15921, +11825 21 45, +15 168, +135
Intex Aqua 230 900, +559 142, +88 266, +171 128, +87 9824, +5728 21 37, +7 44, +11
Samsung S6 370 1102, +761 215, +161 430, +335 180, +139 14412, +10316 158, +137 43, +13 81, +48
Sony Xperia 218 793, +452 139, +85 265, +170 113, +72 9308, +5212 22, +1 37, +7 42, +9
+ denotes the number of additions compared to AOSP
Figure 1: Policy comparison and complexity.
allow thermald socket device : sock file
{write create setattr unlink}
allow mediaserver default prop :
property service set
allow untrusted app unlabeled : dir
{ioctl read getattr search open}
allow untrusted app unlabeled :
filesystem getattr
Plausible reasons for OEMs to use default types
include the fact that objects are automatically as-
signed default types, and the common practice of us-
ing tools like audit2allow (SELinux Project, 2014)
which parse audit logs and automatically create new
allow rules to permit denied accesses.
There are two main consequences of such mis-
takes. Foregoing distinct, dedicated types in favor of
default types means that different, unrelated resources
are collected under a common label: domains with
access to said label thus get wider access rights than
actually needed. This is undesirable, as it violates the
principle of least privilege. The second, more severe,
consequence is that some untrusted domains might be
given access to default labeled sensitive objects.
Fortunately, we did not find examples of such
cases in the policies we examined, apart from the ex-
ample above where untrusted app is given some ac-
cess to unlabeled filesystem objects; however, the
possibility of such mistakes remains.
Google is actively trying to address this problem
by fine-tuning the set of neverallow rules in the
AOSP reference policy. Starting from Android 5.1,
OEMs are not allowed to modify this set. For exam-
ple, it is not possible anymore for an OEM domain to
set default properties or access block devices.
3.2.2 Overuse of Predefined Domains
Another observed trend is that typically OEMs do not
define separate domains for specific system applica-
tions, but tend to place them either in system app or
in platform app domains. Consequently, these do-
mains accumulate a lot of allow rules that are shared
by all system or platform applications. Moreover,
if many applications are pre-installed in the same
Table 2: Usage of default types by OEMs.
unlabeled socket device device default prop system data file
AOSP 25 4 18 0 42
LG Nexus 5 25 7, +3 17, –1 0 45, +3
Intel 27, +2 5, +1 24, +6 3, +3 54, +12
HTC M7 31, +6 17, +13 26, +8 10, +10 68, +26
Motorola G 31, +6 7, +3 17, –1 2, +2 62, +20
LG G3 42, +17 21, +17 28, +10 3, +3 120, +78
Intex Aqua 33, +8 8, +14 23, +5 0 108, +66
Samsung S6 24, –1 22, +18 46, +28 1, +1 204, +162
Sony Xperia 25 15, +11 21, +3 1, +1 57, +15
± denotes the number of additions/removals compared to AOSP
Figure 2: Usage of default types by OEMs.
domain, SEAndroid cannot prevent privilege esca-
lation attacks or unauthorized data sharing by such
apps (Smalley and Craig, 2013). As an example, let
us consider the pre-installed McAfee anti-virus ap-
plication on LG devices. It runs in the system app
domain, which contains more than 900 associated al-
low rules in the LG G3 policy compared to 46 in
the AOSP one. It is quite difficult to identify spe-
cific rules that were added to the system app domain
because of the McAfee application, given that many
other applications run in this domain. However, by
analyzing the permissions of the same McAfee ap-
plication in Google Play Store, we observed corre-
sponding SEAndroid policy rules in the system app
domain, such as access to the telephony functionality,
camera and several types related to the filesystem, in-
cluding tmpfs types and sockets. This might indicate
that these rules were added for the McAfee applica-
tion.
A solution to this problem would be to place cer-
tain powerful system applications in their own SEAn-
droid domains; this can be done by signing these ap-
plications with different keys and creating a mapping
between these keys and target application domains.
Application providers can then distribute their appli-
cations to OEMs signed with these keys, and get their
application to run with the correct set of permissions.
3.2.3 Forgotten or Seemingly Useless Rules
Another common trend is the presence of rules that
seem to have no effect. One example is rules of the
following type present in one device:
allow untrusted app <xyz> exec : file
<file op>
For example
allow untrusted app tee exec : file {read
getattr execute open}
Since no corresponding process transition rule
from the untrusted app domain to the tee
domain via tee exec file is defined, and no
execute no trans access type is granted, a process
running in the untrusted app domain cannot ex-
ecute a file labeled as tee exec. There are two
plausible explanations. One is the use of tools like
audit2allow (SELinux Project, 2014) to automati-
cally generate rules, as discussed above. The other is
the failure to clean up rules that were tested at some
point but are no longer required. Below is an exam-
ple of a vestigial rule that allows access to the debug
interface of the Qualcomm KGSL GPU driver, which
is itself disabled in production builds:
allow untrusted app sysfs kernel debug kgsl
: file {read getattr}
3.2.4 Potentially Dangerous Rules
When working under tight time-to-market require-
ments, OEMs might decide to ship less strict secu-
rity policies rather than make invasive changes to their
codebase. This leads to a number of potentially dan-
gerous rules appearing in OEM policies, like access to
the procfs security-related filesystem objects. The
rules below give read/write permissions on such
objects to a trusted hal domain, a release app do-
main and an untrusted app domain.
allow hal proc security : file {write
getattr open}
allow release app proc security : file
{ioctl read getattr lock open}
allow untrusted app proc security : file
{read getattr open}
While processes running in the hal system do-
main can be considered trusted, the first rule is unde-
sirable because it increases the attack surface of cer-
tain interfaces (like sensitive procfs settings) if the
trusted process is compromised. The same applies to
applications put in the release app domain, as in the
second rule. The third rule is even more dangerous,
because it allows malicious applications running in
the untrusted app domain to get sensitive informa-
tion, such as mmap min addr, memory randomization
parameters and kernel pointer exposure settings, that
can be used for further exploits.
Another example of a potentially dangerous rule
is allowing processes running in the untrusted app
domain to read/write application data belonging to
the system app domain:
allow untrusted app system app data file :
file {read write getattr}
However, since processes from untrusted app
and system app domains will be run with different
UIDS, the Linux DAC layer would guard against such
arbitrary accesses unless a system application erro-
neously made its own files world-accessible.
In general, OEMs should have no additions to
the set of rules for the untrusted app domain, be-
cause any new allow rule increases the possible at-
tack surface for malicious untrusted app applica-
tions. However, Table 1 shows that almost all OEMs
do add new rules for the untrusted app domain.
Some small additions can be explained by the fact
that OEM devices are different, and, in order for a
simple application to access the display or some other
basic non-sensitive functionality, they might need ad-
ditional rules not present in the AOSP policy. An ex-
ample is the rule below, that gives untrusted applica-
tions read/write access to the temporary buffers of
the surfaceflinger daemon. The actual implemen-
tation of the graphical stack on this device makes it
secure to allow such access, which is needed for the
applications to operate properly.
allow untrusted app
surfaceflinger tmpfs:file {read write}
However, when OEMs define tens or hundreds of
new allow rules for the untrusted app domain, it
is an indicator that the policy was not designed with
care and may have flaws. We found comparatively
more mistakes in those OEM policies that had more
allow rules defined for the untrusted app domain.
On a positive note, OEMs are aware of such mis-
takes; some of them have been already fixed in the
subsequent Android 5.1 update. The major reason
behind these fixes was the release of the Android
Compatibility Test Suite (CTS)2 version 5.1, that
added tests to ensure that AOSP neverallow rules
are not violated by any process running on a device.
The initial CTS version 5.0 only checked that pro-
cesses running in the AOSP domains did not violate
neverallow rules.
3.2.5 Discussion
We found several problematic patterns in the Android
5.0 OEM SEAndroid policies we examined. We con-
jecture that the reason for their presence is the rel-
ative unfamiliarity with SEAndroid. Google utilizes
the set of neverallow rules in order to try to pre-
vent OEMs from making security mistakes. How-
ever, while this approach might prevent some mis-
takes, it can also create difficulties for OEMs. For ex-
ample any Global Platform-enabled TEE design 3 will
2source.android.com/compatibility/cts/
index.html
3globalplatform.org
likely end up with untrusted app applications need-
ing to access a kernel driver for their memory refer-
encing. In Android 5.1 this conflicts with the existing
neverallow rules, and as a result OEMs are forced
to come up with a workaround. In the next section we
propose a set of tools that can further help OEMs to
avoid security mistakes and at the same time do not
imply any restrictions on OEMs.
4 NEW TOOLS FOR SEANDROID
Although our systematic manual analysis un-
earthed some problem areas in the policies we an-
alyzed, the process was cumbersome and time-
consuming using the currently available tools. Based
on our experience, we argue that new tools or new
functionality in existing tools are necessary to aid
both OEMs and security researchers to create and
analyze SEAndroid policies effectively. We identify
several such desirable tools below. We have imple-
mented the first on the list (live policy analyzer) and
are working on the rest.
4.1 Live Policy Analyzer
Existing SELinux policy analysis tools focus solely
on the policy itself, and do not address the question of
how the policy rules apply to a specific target device.
A tool that can answer questions like “what files can a
specified process on a device access?” or “what pro-
cesses on a device can access a specified file?” would
be very useful for the analyst. We developed SEAn-
droid Live device analysis tool (SEAL)4 for this pur-
pose. SEAL allows different queries that take into
account not only the SEAndroid policy loaded on the
device, but also the actual device state, i.e. running
processes and filesystem objects. SEAL offers com-
mand line and GUI interfaces, and queries the device
over the adb interface. In order to obtain results about
the entire device filesystem, the target device has to
be either rooted or running an engineering build. Fig-
ure 3 shows the architecture of SEAL.
4.2 Policy Decompilation Tool
One of the main problems during our manual analysis
was the lack of a tool to easily identify and analyze
changes that an OEM made to the default AOSP pol-
icy. Current tools like apol and sediff are not di-
rectly suited for this task, as described in Section 3.2.
4github.com/seandroid-analytics/seal
Figure 3: SEAL tool architecture
It would be very beneficial to have a tool able to trans-
form a binary policy into a set of source files orga-
nized similarly to the AOSP SEAndroid source policy.
In this case, it would not only be possible to perform
manual analysis in a more organized and convenient
manner, but also to employ standard text manipula-
tion tools to compare or filter needed information.
4.3 Policy Visualization Tool
SELinux has the notion of attributes, that allow
organizing policy types and domains in a hierarchi-
cal manner. This is a very powerful mechanism that
can easily be misconfigured by mistake. The data
collected in section 3.1 showed that most OEMs do
not create new policy attributes, perhaps due to the
perceived complexity of the attribute mechanism. A
tool to visualize hierarchies induced by attributes may
help an analyst better understand and make use of at-
tributes effectively.
4.4 Policy Analyzer
The hardest part of our manual analysis was iden-
tifying rules that are either potentially dangerous or
possibly unnecessary. The analysis can be automated
with a set of heuristic checks. The tool can also utilize
SEAL in order to make policy queries with regards to
the device state.
Let us consider the following rule from sec-
tion 3.2.4 and explain how it can be automatically de-
tected as suspicious:
allow untrusted app tee exec : file {read
getattr execute open}
The tool first uses SEAL to fetch from a device all
files with the tee exec label. Then it queries SEAL
for all labels and DAC permissions of all higher-level
directories on the path to each tee exec file, and tries
to determine if the untrusted app domain can even
reach the target file to perform the requested opera-
tions. If the first check passes, the analyzer can further
check that each requested access control type makes
sense. For example, in order for execute to succeed
given that execute no trans access is not granted,
there has to be a type transition rule defined; fur-
thermore, in order to be able to write or read a file,
one would also normally need to have open permis-
sion. The policy analyzer can mark the rule as not
functional if the checks fail.
In order to identify potentially dangerous rules,
the policy analyzer can scan rules for possible ad-
ditional usages of default types, mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, and analyze new rules associated with sen-
sitive types, such as tee or proc security, or un-
trusted domains, such as the untrusted app domain.
One use of the policy analyzer is its integration
into OEMs’ automatic build systems, in order to con-
sistently verify that the policy does not contain un-
reachable or potentially dangerous rules, and that it
is optimized with regards to the usage of attributes
and types. This would provide value for OEMs, since
policy additions might be made by different develop-
ment teams, possibly without detailed knowledge of
SEAndroid. The output of the tool can be further an-
alyzed manually by a person with detailed knowledge
of SEAndroid, in order to reject or accept suggested
modifications.
5 RELATED WORK
Several tools and methods originally designed for
SELinux are relevant to the new mobile environment.
The de facto standard for handling SELinux poli-
cies in text and binary format is the SETools li-
brary (Tresys, 2014): this contains the aforemen-
tioned apol and sediff tools, which can be used in-
terchangeably on SELinux and SEAndroid.
Formal methods have been used for SELinux pol-
icy analysis. Gokyo (Jaeger et al., 2003) is a policy
analysis tool designed to identify and resolve conflict-
ing policy specifications. Usage of the HRU security
model (Harrison et al., 1976) has been proposed as an
approach to SELinux policy analysis (Amthor et al.,
2011). Information flow analysis has been applied
to SELinux policies (Guttman et al., 2005). These
analysis methods are not SELinux-specific, and can
be easily adapted to SEAndroid.
Some researchers have applied information vi-
sualization techniques to SELinux policy analy-
sis (Clemente et al., 2012), also in combination with
clustering (Marouf and Shehab, 2011). These tech-
niques are also system-agnostic, and we may use them
in future SEAndroid tools.
SELinux policy generation and refining tools are
rare. Polgen, a tool for semi-automated SELinux pol-
icy generation based on system call tracing (Sniffen
et al., 2006), appears to be no longer in active de-
velopment. The SELinux userspace tools (SELinux
Project, 2014) can generate SELinux policies. One
of these tools, audit2allow, is widely used to au-
tomatically generate and refine SELinux policies by
converting SELinux audit messages into rules; these
policies, however, are not necessarily correct, com-
plete or secure, since the rules depend on code paths
taken during execution, and there is no way to dis-
tinguish intended and possibly malicious application
behavior. These tools are used both in SELinux and
SEAndroid.
There has been some research in applying Do-
main Specific Languages (DSL) (Fowler, 2010) to
SELinux policy development and verification (Hurd
et al., 2009). The authors proposed a tool (shrimp) to
analyze and find errors in the SELinux Reference Pol-
icy, similar to the Lint tool for C. This is similar to a
tool we propose, but different in scope as it is limited
to analysis of the SELinux reference policy.
The only SEAndroid-specific analysis method is
based on audit log analysis with machine learn-
ing (Wang et al., 2015). This approach is completely
different from what we propose, since it relies on sig-
nificant volumes of data to classify rules.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a number of common mis-
takes made by OEMs in their SEAndroid policies,
suggesting potential reasons behind them. As a re-
sult of this study, we identified a number of practical
tools that should help OEMs and security researchers
to improve SEAndroid policies. We provided the im-
plementation of a first tool, SEAL, and we are cur-
rently working on the rest.
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